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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. BYRON FERGUSON, 
Plaitnti ff and A·ppelloot, 
vs. 
J. OSCAR GARRETT and STELLA P. 
GARRETT, his wife, 
Defendatnts and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 
7257 
The plaintiff brought this action to recover damages, 
both general and special, for the breach of a written con-
tract for the sale of real property and for damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff because of the breach of the coven-
ants of a warranty deed executed and delivered by the 
defendants to the plaintiff in pursuance of the contract 
of sale. 
The first document executed by the parties in their 
negotiations provides: 
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''Received from R. Byron Ferguson the sum 
of Two Hundred and Fifty Dollars, to secure 
and apply on the purchase of the following des-
cribed property: Home at 726 North University 
Ave. and Store building, including shelving and 
heater, and apartment house, consisting of three 
3 room apartments, including 3 heaters and ice 
box for the purchase price of Twenty-Four Thou-
sand Dollars. The balance of purchase price shall 
be paid as follows: Fifteen Thousand Dollars on 
or before 90 days from date (above) and the bal-
ance $9,000.00 on or before 2 years at 3% interest 
per annum until paid. Interest shall be charged 
on all unpaid portions of the purchase price at 
3% per annum, and possession given in 90 days 
(Seller to occupy North apartment for 2 years, 
rent free). 
Taxes for the current fiscal year ending De-
cember 31st, following this date and the insurance, 
rents and other expenses of said property shall 
be pro-rated as of date of delivery of deed or 
final contract of sale. All other taxes and assess-
ments shall be paid by owner except the follow-
ing: No exceptions. Insurance as written goes 
with property. 
Contract of sale to be mde on 'the approved 
form of the PROVO REAL ESTATE BOARD 
in the name of ______________________________________________________________ , 
In the event said purchaser shall fail to pay 
the balance of said purchase price or complete 
said purchase as herein provided, the amounts 
paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller, be re-
tained as liquidated and agreed damages. 
The payment is received and sale is made sub-
ject to owner's approval, and unless so approved 
on or before ____________ days from date the return of 
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the money herein receipted shall cancel this sale 
without damage, to the undersigned. 
We do hereby agree to carry out and fulfill 
the terms and conditions in the above receipt 
specified, the owner agreeing to furnish a good 
marketable title with abstract to date, or policy 
of title insurance and to make final conveyance 
by sufficient deed. 
Buyer /s/ R. BYRON FERGUSON 
NO AGENT /s/ STELLA P. GARRETT 
Seller /s/ J. OSCAR GARRETT 
R. 8 and Exhibit "A". 
Thereafter the following instrument was executed 
by the parties : 
"We, J. Oscar Garre·tt and Stella P. Garrett, 
husband and wife, the undersigned, acknowledge 
receipt of Six Thousand Nine Hundr·ed Seventy-
Seven and 59/100 Dollars, from R. Byron Fergu-
son and further acknowledge that the method of 
payment in the certain Earnest Money Receipt 
dated July 29, 1946 by and between said parties 
is changed and amended to read : 
Seven Thousand Two Hundred and No/100 
($7200.00) within 90 days from dat:e (July 29, 
1946) and the balance as represented by certain 
notes and mortgages executed this 26 day of 
October, A. D. 1946 by R. Byron Ferguson and 
Faun C. Ferguson, his wife, which is part read 
as follows: 
1 note dated October 26, 194'6 for $9,000.00, 
payable on or before two (2) years from date, 
with interest, payable quarterly at the rate of 3 
per cent per annutn. 
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1 note dated October 26, 1946 for $3,000.00, 
payable on or before one (1) year from date, with 
interest, payable quarterly at the rate of 5 per 
cent per annum. 
1 note dated October 26, 1946 for $4,800.00, 
payable 75 days from date with no interest. 
All of the rest of the provisions of said Earn-
est Money Receipt (Contract remains unchanged). 
/s/ J. OSCAR GARRETT 
/s/ STELLA P. GARRETT 
Receipt of $27.59 included in the above is for pro-
rated portion of the 1946 general taxes, paid by R. Byron 
F·erguson." R. 9 and Exhibit "B". 
On October 18th, 1946 the defendants made and 
executed a statutory form of warranty deed which pro-
vides: 
WARRANTY DEED 
"J. OSCAR GARRETT and STELLA P. 
GARRETT, his wife, Grantors, of Provo, Utah, 
hereby CONVEY AND WARRANT to R. BY-
RON FERGUSON and FAUN C. FERGUSON, 
husband and wife as Joint Tennants, with full 
right of survivorship, Grantees of Provo, Utah, 
for the sum of $12,000.00, Twelve Thousand Dol-
lars and other valuable consideration the follow-
ing described tract of land in Utah County, State 
of Utah, to-wit: 
Comm·encing 6 rods North of the Southwest 
corner of Block 8, Plat '' D' ', Provo City Survey; 
which is also 11 rods North of the N othwest cor-
ner of' Block 29, Plat '' C '' Provo City Survey of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
Building Lots ; thence East 9 rods; thence North 
6 rods; thence "\Y est 9 rods; thence South 6 rods 
to the place of beginning. 
$26.95 Revenue Stamps. 
"\YITXESS THE HANDS of said Grantors 
this 18th day of October, A. D. 1946. 
Signed in the presence of 
Is! J. OSCAR GARRETT 
/s/ WESTON GARRETT 
/s/ STELLA P. GARRETT 
STATE OF UTAH ) ) ss. 
County of Utah----------------------) 
On the 18th day of October, A. D. 1946, per-
sonally appeared before me, a Notary Public in 
and for the State of Utah, J. OSCAR GARRETT 
and STELLA P. GARRETT, his wife, the signers 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged 
to me that they executed the same. 
/s/ A. K. BREINHOL.T 
N ot•ary Public 
(SEAL) Residing at Provo, Utah 
My Commission Expires 8-17-49'' 
R. 10 and Exhibit "C ". 
It is in substance alleged in the complaint that at 
the time plaintiff entered into negotiations for the ·pur-
chase from the defendants of a store building, a home 
and a three unit apartment house located at 726 North 
University Avenue in Provo, Utah, he, the plaintiff, was 
engaged in the business of coal trucking, operating a 
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farm west of Provo and feeding some cattle for beef. 
That he had been injured and desired to purchase de-
fendants' property for the purpose of living in one of 
the apartments, renting the other apartments and con-
ducting a grocery store and meat market in the store 
building which were on the premises which he sought to 
purchase. That prior to and during the negotiations 
for the purchase of the premises and the improvements 
on the property plaintiff informed the defendants of the 
purposes for which he, the plaintiff, desired to purchase 
the property. That at the time the negotiations for the 
purchase of the property were being conducted and at 
the time the property was conveyed to the plaintiff by 
the defendants there was a tenant in possession of the 
store building. According to the allegations of the com-
plaint ·the defendants informed the plaintiff that the 
tenant so in possession of the store building was renting 
the same from month to month. R-1 to 6. 
Plaintiff also alleges that prior to bringing his ac-
tion he had demanded possession of the store building, 
but was unable to secure possession thereof to his dam-
age in the sum of $500.00 per month from November 1st, 
1946 until he secured possession thereof, $1050 loss on 
the sale of cattle and $300.00 feed bill on the cattle which 
he held for the purpose of selling at retail in the store 
building and $200.00 for the depreciation of 'the equip-
ment which he bought for use in the store building and 
for costs. That the reasonable rental value of the store 
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In their answer the defendants admit the execution 
of the written instruments above mentioned. They also 
admit that demand was Inade for the possession of the 
store building. They deny that they informed the plain-
tiff that the tenant, who was in possession of the store 
building was leasing such building from month to month 
and they allege the fact to be that they, the defendants, 
during the negotiations for the sale of the property, 
informed the plaintiff that the store building was leased 
and that possession of the property would be given sub-
ject to the lease on the store building. R. 19 to 24. The 
lease on the store building was admitted in evidence as 
defendants' Exhibit 1. 
At the trial the parties offered evidence in support 
of their respective allegations. At the conclusion of the 
evidence and argument of counsel the trial court found 
the issues in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiff and entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff 
prosecutes this appeal from the judgment so entered. 
There are two fundamental questions presented for 
determination on this appeal. They are : 
1. Is parol evidence competent to vary the terms 
of a written contract for the sale of real estate and of a 
statutory Warranty Deed given to consummate such 
contract~ 
2. In case of a breach of a contract for the sale of 
real estate and of the covenants contained in a Warranty 
Deed may the injured party recover special damages 
for the breach, or is such injured party limited to re-
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cover merely the reasonable rental value of the property 
during the time he is deprived of the possession thereof? 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
The plaintiff and appellant assigns the following 
errors upon which he relies for a reversal of the judg-
ment appealed from: 
1. The trial court erred in denying the motion to 
strike the following allegations from paragraph 6 on 
page 2 of defendants' answer, ''and in that connectional-
leges that prior to its execution by defendants they ad-
vised plaintiff that they would deliver possession of said 
premises subject to the existing leases and tenancies 
existing thereon and prior to July 29, 1946, including the 
leases on the store building.'' R. 28 and Tr. 1. 
2. The trial court erred in denying the motion to 
strike the following allegations from paragraph 10 on 
page 3 of defendants' answer, "subject to all leases and 
tenancies existing thereon'' and in that connection allege 
that prior to July 29, 1946 defendants specifically in-
.formed plaintiff that they could not and would not deliver 
possession of the said store building as the tenant therein 
occupied same under a lease which had not expired, and 
being so informed the plaintiff agreed and undertook in 
the agreement of sale of said premises to accept posses-
sion of said store building and premises, subject to said 
leases hereinafter set forth in defendants' affirmative 
answer." R. 28 and Tr. 1. 
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3. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 11 on page 3 of defendants' answer the fol-
lowing: ''and in that connection the defendants allege 
that possession of same was delivered strictly in ac-
cordance with the agreement between plaintiff and de-
fendants and subject to leases and tenancies existing 
on said premises including the store building lease as 
hereinafter alleged.'' R. 28. 
4. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 11 on page 3 of defendants' answ~er the fol-
lowing allegation: ''and subject to leases and tenancies 
existing on said premises including store building lease 
as hereinafter alleged.'' 
5. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
defendants' answer the following allegation: ''that dur-
ing those negotiations and on or about July 15, 1946, de-
fendants advised plaintiff that one Haddock had pos-
session of the store building situated on said premises 
under a lease." R. 28 and Tr. 1. 
6. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 2 on page 4 of defendants' answer the follow-
ing allegation: ''and that defendants would he unable 
to remove said tenant." R. 28 and Tr.l. 
7. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 2 on page 4 of defendants' answer the fol-
lowing allegation: ''and if the sale was made plain,tiff 
would have to take possession of said store subject to 
the tenants rights under said lease." R. 28 and Tr. 1. 
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8. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 2 on page 4 of defendants' answer the follow-
ing allegation: ''that the plaintiff being so advised and 
fully informed concerning said Haddock lease on the 
store building then and there undertook and agreed that 
if defendants would sell said premises to him that he 
would assume the obligation of getting the Haddocks 
out of the store.'' R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
9. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 2 on page 4 of the defendants' answer the 
following allegation: ''and plaintiff further stated to 
defendants that while he was waiting for the Haddocks 
to vacate said store he had other things he could be 
doing, to-wit: operate his coal business, operate his farm 
and orchard in Orem, Utah, operate his real estate and 
his insurance business.'' R. 29. 
10. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 3 on page 4 of the defendants' answer the 
following allegation: ''that pursuant to the said agree-
ment of plaintiff to purchase the said premises subject 
to the rights of the tenants in possession and particularly 
tenant Haddock's rights under his lease for said store 
building, the defendants signed said earnest money 
memorando Exhibits "A'' and "B", aforesaid, on July 
29 and October 2,6, 1946, respectively." R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
11. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 3, page 4 of the defendants' answer the fol-
lowing allegation: '' tha:t further in pursuance of said 
Agreement and on or about August 3, 1946, defendants 
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notified their tenant Haddock that the plaintiff was the 
new owner of said premises, including the store building 
occupied by him, and to pay rent to him thereafter.'' 
R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
12. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 3 on page 4, of the defendants' answer the 
following allegation: "and that pursuant to said plain-
tiff's agreement, and not otherwise, defendants on No-
vember 1, 1946, delivered possession of the entire prem-
ises, including said store building to plaintiff.'' R. 29 and: 
Tr.l. 
13. The trial court ·erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 3 on page 4 of the defendants' answer the fol-
lowing allegation: "subject to the existing rights of 
tenants occupying said premises, and particularly the 
lease rights of said tenant Haddock in said store build-
ing.'' R. 29 and ·Tr. 1. 
14. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 3 on page 5 of defendants' answer the follow-
ing allegation: "and that plaintiff received possession 
of said premises as aforesaid on said last mentioned date 
and now has same, and has had and enjoyed same at all 
times since.'' R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
15. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 4 on page 5 of defendants' answer the follow-
ing allegation: "That within a day or two after said 
agreement was made, on or about August 1, 1946, so 
defendants are informed and believe, the plaintiff went 
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to the said tenant Haddock and demanded immediate 
possession of said store building, and said tenant re-
fused to surrender possession thereof to the plaintiff 
stating to him that his (Haddock's) lease had not ex-
pired." R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
16. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 4, page 5, of defendants' answer the follow-
ing allegation: ''that subsequently and on or about Octo-
ber 16, 1946, plaintiff advised defendants that said Had-
dock refused to surrender possession of said store build-
ing, at which time defendants offered to call the whole 
deal off and postpone it until said Haddock's lease had 
expired." R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
17. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 4, page 5 of defendants' answer the following 
allegation: ''but that plaintiff then and there advised 
defendants that he was not worried, and that he could 
get the Haddocks out of the store building in 30 days 
and that he wanted to go through with the deal." R. 29 
and Tr. 1. 
18. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 4 on page 5 of defendants' answer the fol-
lowing allegation: "that thereupon defendants reminded 
plaintiff of his agreement to accept possession of said 
store building subject to Haddock's lease rights and that 
plaintiff was going to do other things until said lease 
expired, whereupon the plaintiff told defendants he had 
changed his mind." R. 29 and Tr. 1. 
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19. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 5 on page 3 of defendants' answer the follow-
ing allegation: "that defendants have fully performed 
their agreement with plaintiff for the sale of said prem-
ises, and have delivered possession of the same, and par-
ticularly the said store building, to the plaintiff in ac-
cordance with the said agreement subject to the lease 
rights of the said tenant Haddock.'' R. 30 and Tr. 1. 
20. The trial court erred in refusing to strike from 
paragraph 6 on page 5 of the defendants' answer the fol-
lowing allegation: ''that if the plaintiff has suffered any 
damage by reason of said transaction, it is not due to 
any failure of defendants to perform their said agree-
ment, but is a result of the plaintiff's own breach of his 
agreement to accept possession of said premises subject 
to the right of said tenant Haddock ·to posession of said 
store building.'' R. 30 and Tr.l. 
21. The trial court erred in overruling the o bj ec-
tions to the testimony of Mrs. Haddock touching the 
tender of checks to Mr. Ferguson and ·the admission in 
evidence of such checks. Tr. 46-50. 
22. The trial court erred in sustaining objection to 
the following question asked plaintiff: "How much did 
it cost you to feed the cattle from November 1st, 1946 
until the time you sold them~'' Tr. 65-66. 
23. The trial court erred in striking the following 
answer of the plaintiff: ''I had made arrangements with 
the Provo Packing Company by the steel plant to slaugh-
ter these cattle as I needed them and hold them in their 
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ice box, cure them. They were to be sold over the counter, 
meat counter.'' Tr. 66. 
24 The trial court erred in sustaining objection 
to the following question asked plaintiff: "What were 
your earnings in the last few months that you were in 
·the coal trucking business~ '' Tr. 67. 
24. The trial court erred in sustaining the objection 
to the following question: ''Now from the amount you 
did earn when you went in the real estate business, do 
you have a judgment what you could have earned by 
way of commission with Rowan & Grow~" Tr. 74. 
25. The trial court erred in sustaining the objection 
to the following question asked of the plaintiff: ''Well 
how much did you make on an average in the real estate 
business after you did get in the real estate business, for 
the ensuing few months~" Tr. 75. 
In order that the court may better understand the 
assigned errors touching the admission of parol evid~nce 
touching the terms of ·the written contract and warranty 
deed we quote the following from the objections of one 
of counsel for the plaintiff: 
''If the court please, at this time, in order to save 
time and not keep butting in, we object to any conversa-
tion had if it is intended by the conversation to vary 
the terms of this written instrument that has been offered 
in evidence, any conversation if it is calculated in any 
way to vary the terms of the writt~n instrument, the 
contract, the written contract, and warranty deed. \Ve 
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would like to have it understood any such testilnony is 
objected to without interposing that objection too fre-
quently. Of course, we can object to them as they come 
up, if that is ·preferable. We thought we would save 
time.',- Tr. 138. 
''The court: The record may ·show your objection 
against the same, for the purpose indicated." Tr. 138. 
26. The trial court erred in admitting and in re-
fusing to strike that part of the testimony of Mrs. Gar-
rett where she testified: "That Mr. Garrett said 'I 
have people with a contract on the store and I can't let 
you have the store.' He said: 'Well that don't make any 
difference to me'." Tr. 140. 
27. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence 
and refusing to strike the following testimony of Mrs. 
Garrett: "as Mr. Ferguson, as he had said he would take 
the property with the lease." Tr. 144. 
28. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence 
and in refusing to strike the following testimony of Mrs. 
Garrett : ''I know that was the time that 1fr. Garrett 
said that when the Haddocks lease had expired, at the 
expiration of two years lease, he thought the contract or 
lease \Vas on a month to month basis, and that the 
Haddocks thought the clause in the lease gave them the 
privilege of staying another two years. Then Mr. Fergu-
son asked about the clause in the lease, and he said he was 
not worried about the lease, or the clause in the lease, 
that he could easily get the Haddocks out in thirty days. 
J\fr. Garrett snys: 'Now, l\Ir. Ferguson, you know I must 
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have Haddocks taken care of.' He says: 'Sure, sure'." 
Tr. 148. 
29. The trial court erred in permitting Mrs. Gar-
rett to testify and in refusing to strike the following part 
of her testimony: "Q. Is that a week after July 29th? 
A. The 29th. I would say around Thursday or Friday, 
Mr. Ferguson came to my door and said: 'Mrs. Garrett, 
will you tell me exactly how your lease reads with the 
Haddocks?' I said: 'Our lease calls for an option of 
staying two years and there is a clause in the lease giving 
them the privilege of staying two more years.' }.1:r. 
Ferguson said: 'Did they ever serve any papers on you, 
any writing about it.' I said: 'No.' He said: 'Then it is 
not worth the paper it is written on'." Tr. 150. 
30. The trial court erred in permitting Mrs. Gar-
rett to testify and in refusing to strike the following 
testimony: "Mr. Ferguson said, 'Mrs. Garrett, will you 
tell 1Ir. Garrett to get the I-Iaddocks out of the store?' 
I said: 'M~r. Ferguson we understood you didn't want the 
store.' He said: I have changed my mind; my lawyer 
says I can get the Haddocks out of the store'. I said: 
'Mr. Ferguson, why don't you get them out?' He said.: 
'Because my lawyer said it is Mr. Garrertt's place to get 
them out'." Tr. 153. 
31. The trial court erred in permitting Mrs. Gar-
rett to testify and in refusing to strike the following: 
''He said he would take that responsibility himself.'' 
(getting the Haddocks out). On that occassion he said he 
had changed his mind.'' Tr. 153. 
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32. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence 
over the objection of the plaintiff a purported copy of 
the letter shown at page 159 of the transcript. 
It should be noted that at the commencement of the 
testimony of defendent J. Oscar Garrett one of counsel 
for the plaintiff made the following objection:.'' May 
we have the same objection to all of the testimony that 
this witness may give with respect to these particular 
conversation, that it tends to vary the terms of the writ-
ten instruments, insofar as they tend to vary the terms of 
the written instruments, that they are incompetent, 
for that reason." The court: "The record may so show." 
Tr. 178. 
33. The trial court erred in permitting Mr. Garrett 
to testify and refusing to strike the following part of his 
testimony: "I have had Haddocks in the store and 
they have a contract, so I can't put them out. These other 
people that asked to buy my property wanted to take 
immediate possession, so I didn't sell to them. Mr. Fer-
guson said: "That is all right, I have several other 
things to do." Tr. 178-179. 
34. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence 
and in refusing to strike the testimony of ?\fr. Garrett 
wherein he testified: "I told him (Ferguson) I thought 
it (lease) was running on a month to month basis, but the 
Haddocks insisted that they was entitled to remain in the 
store. Mr. Ferguson said the law reads I only have to 
give them thirty days notice and then they will havP. to 
get out. I turned to Mr. Ferguson and I said, in sub-
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stance, 'l\1r. Ferguson, I want the Haddocks taken care 
of.' He said : 'Sure, sure'." Tr. 183-184. 
35. The trial court erred in overruling plaintiff's 
objection to the following question: "Now from your 
conversations with plaintiff before July 29, 1946 what 
was your understanding when you wrote the words 
''possession to be given in ninety days'' into the Ernest 
~foney Agreement that has been introduced~" Tr. 194. 
36. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence 
over ~the objection of plaintiff the testimony of Mignon 
Garrett wherein she testified that her mother said: ''Mr. 
Ferguson why are you so interested in having Haddocks 
get out of the store when you told us they could stay in 
there as long as their contract was good~ He said: ''I 
have changed my mind.'' Tr. 232. 
37. The trial court erred in permitting, over plain-
tiff's objection, the witness Jay Garrett to testify: "He 
said: (apparently meaning ~the defendant Mr. Garrett) I 
have a contract with the Haddocks in the store and I 
must give them a chance to.'' I think he said ''I must 
take care of the Haddocks." Mr. Ferguson said: "Well, 
that is all right; while I am waiting I have some other 
businesses that I can go into." Tr. 236. 
38. ·The trial court erred in admitting the following 
testimony of the witness Jay Garrett. ''Father said: 
'Well, Mr. Ferguson, I understood that you were going 
to take care of the Haddocks'. And I turned to ~Ir. 
Ferguson, I said: 'Mr. Ferguson, right down deep in 
your heart, you knew that you were to take care of the 
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Haddocks.' He said: ·Jay, you know that IS a lie'." 
Tr. 239. 
39. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding number 3 wherein it found: ''That during those 
negotiations and on or about July 15, 1946 defendants 
advised the plaintiff that if the sale was made the plain-
tiff would have to take the property subject to the right 
of the said Haddock who would have to be taken care of. 
R. 51-52. That such finding is without support by any 
competent evidence and it at variance with the written 
contract of sale and with the covenants contained in the 
warranty deed executed and delivered to the plaintiff. 
R. 51-52. 
40. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 3 wherein it found: ''that the plaintiff 
-represented to the defendants that if they would sell 
said premises to him the plaintiff would assume the 
obligation of getting Haddock out of the store." That 
such finding is without support by any competent evi-
dence and is at variance mth the written instruments 
·which constitute the agreement of the parties to this 
litigation. R. 52. 
41. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 4 wherein it found: ''That pursuant 
to and acting in reliance upon said representations of the 
plaintiff to purchase said premises subject to the rights 
of the tenants in possession, particularly by Haddocks' 
rights under his lease for said store building the defen-
dents signed the said agreements A and B." That such 
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finding is wholly unsupported by any competent evi-
dence. R. 52. 
42. The trial court erred in making that part of its 
finding numbered 4 wherein it found that defendants 
''acting in reliance upon said representations (of plain-
tiff's) the defendants made, executed and delivered their 
warranty deed to the plaintiff." That such finding is 
wholly without support by any competent evidence. R. 
52. 
43. The trial court erred in that part of its finding 
nmnbered 4 wherein it found: ''that pursuant to their 
agreement with the ·plaintiff the defendants served a 
written notice on Don D. Haddock.'' That such finding 
is wholly without support in the evidence in that there 
is no evidence that the defendants undertook or agreed 
to serve any written notice on Haddock. R. 62. 
44. The trial court erred in finding: ''that pur-
suant to said agreement defendants on Nov. 1st, 1946 
delivered possession of the entire premises including the 
store building to the plaintiff-and plaintiff received 
possession of said premises - on November 1, 1946.'' 
That said finding in so far as it applies to the store 
building is wholly without support in the evidence. Tr. 52. 
45. The trial court erred in making iots finding num-
bered 5 and the whole thereof. That such finding is 
wholly without support by any competent evidence. R. 
52. 
46. The trial court erred in making its so-called 
finding numbered 6 and particularly in that such so-
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called finding is not a finding of any fact but is a mere 
conclusion of law and if it should be a finding of fact it 
is without supp<>rt in the evidence. R. 53. 
4 7. The trial court erred in failing to find on all of 
the issues of facts raised by the pleadings. 
48. The trial court erred in making its conclusion 
of law No. 1 in that the same is without support in the 
evidence. It is not supported by the findings of fact and 
is contrary to law. R. 53. 
49. The trial court erred in entering judgment in 
favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff in that 
such judgment is without support in the evidence but 
is contrary thereto and is likewise without support in the 
findings of fact and the same is contrary to law. R. 53. 
ARGUMENT 
The questions presented by this appeal are: 
1. May defendants in an action to recover damages 
for the breach of a written contract and for the breach of 
the covenants of a statutory warranty deed, where no 
fraud or mistake is claimed, after having admitted the 
execution of such written contract and statutory war-
ranty deed properly plead as a defense to such action 
oral statements alleged to have been made by the plaintiff 
prior to the execution of such written contract and statu-
. tory warranty deed~ 
2. Is parol evidence properly admitted to show 
that the words ''possession given in 90 days (Seller to 
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occupy N. apt for 2 years rent free) "contained in a 
written contract for the sale and purchase of real pro-
perty are ambiguous or uncertain and for that reason 
subject to be explained by such parol evidence~ 
3. Are the covenants of a statutory warranty deed 
broken when the property conveyed thereby is subject 
to a lease~ 
4. May a plaintiff, who has pleaded special damages 
recover such damages on account of profits which he 
would have realized from selling cattle owned by him 
in a store building which he has purchased but which he 
IS unable to secure possession of, where the defendants 
prior to the purchase of such store building were in-
formed of the purposes for which such store building 
was being purchased~ 
5. Does a finding that the allegations of a com-
plaint are untrue constitute such a finding of fact as is 
required by law~ 
6. Are the findings of fact in this case supported by 
any competent evidence~ 
7. Are the conclusions of law in this case supported 
by the evidence or by the findings of fact~ 
8. Is the judgTnent in this case supported by the 
evidence or the findings of fact~ 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYIKG THE 
MOTION TO STRIKE THE VARIOUS ALLEGA-
TIONS SOUGHT BY PLAINTIFF'S 1\IOTION TO 
HAVE STRICKEN. 
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In assignments numbered 1 to 20 plaintiff at-
tacks the refusal of the trial court to strike from defen-
dant's ans"~er various allegations contained in their 
answer. The allegations so sought to be stricken are so 
~imilar that in our Yiew the law applicable to each of 
them applies to all and therefore all of such assignments 
will be discussed together. 
It "'ill be noted that in their answer the defendants 
admit that they executed Exhibits "A", "B" and 
"C" which are attached to and made a part of plaintiff's 
complaint and w·hich have heretofore been quoted in this 
brief. That being so all prior negotiations were merged 
in such written documents. All of the oral negotiations 
which were had leading up to the execution of the written 
instruments thus ceased to have any legal effect as to the 
terms of the transaction. The law is well settled that 
in the absence of fraud ''a written contract merges all 
prior and contemporaneous negotiations on the subject, 
together with all prior oral contracts, and together with 
and including antecedent correspondence and prior writ-
ten memorandums." 17 C. J. S. pages 872-874, Sec. 381. 
Numerous cases are collected in foot notes to the text, 
among them being Last Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson, 
25 Pac. (2d) 952; 82 Utah 475; State Bank of Sevier vs. 
American Cen1ent and Plaster Co., 10 Pac. (2) 1065; 80 
Utah 255; Field vs. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 290 Pac. 
979; 77 Utah 45; Halloran Judge Trust Co. vs. Heath 
258 Pac. 342 ; 70 Utah 124; 64 A. L. R. 368. We have 
examined a number of the cases cited and particularly 
those from this jurisdiction. Needless to say that the law 
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announced in the text and the cited cases is so well es-
tablished as to require no argument in support thereof. 
It was suggested at the trial of this cause that be-
cause the plaintif in his complaint alleged that certain 
oral statements were made in the course of the negotia-
tions leading up to the execution of the written instru-
ments which constituted the final consummation of the 
transaction that therefore the plaintiff waived any rights 
that he might otherwise have had to insist on a compli-
ance with the contract as finally agreed upon and as 
evidenced by the written instruments. 
No where in the complaint does the plaintiff question 
the fact that the written instruments constitute the com-
plete agreement. 
The sole purpose of pleading the conversations had 
prior to the execution of the written instruments was 
to make out a case for special damages. 
It is of course elementary law that before special 
damages may be granted the facts relied upon as a basis 
for special damages must be alleged and proven. See 25 
C.J.S., page 755, Subsection 2 and cases there cited in 
foot notes. 
We do not contend that defendants in their answer 
were precluded from denying the allegwtions of the com-
plaint touching the question of special damages but we do 
most ernestly contend that the defendants having ad-
mitted the execution of the 'vritten instruments was pre-
cluded from claiming that the conversation had prior or 
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at the time such instruments were executed, modified 
said written instruments. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN 
EVIDENCE CONv~RS.ATIONS CLAIMED BY THE 
DEFENDANTS TO HAVE BEEN HAD PRIOR TO, 
AT THE TIME AND SUBSEQUENT TO THE EXE-
CUTION OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACTS AND 
THE STATUTORY WARRANTY DEED, EXHIBITS 
''A,'' ''B'' AND ''C,'' IN SO FAR AS THE SAl\fE 
l\IAY MODIFY SUCH INSTRUMENTS. 
\V e have heretofore in this brief under the preceding 
heading directed the court's attention :to the uniformly 
established law which precludes the admission of oral 
evidence which is calculated to add to, detract from or 
otherwise vary the terms of a written instrument. The 
law in such particular is so well established that we shall 
assume opposing counsel will not contend the law to he 
otherwise. 
In our assignments numbered 21 to 38, both inclu-
sive, we have attacked the ruling of the court in admit-
ting in evidence oral testimony which offends against 
such law in so far as such evidence was reeeived for 
the purpose of adding to, detracting from or otherwise 
varying the terms of the written instruments, Exhibits 
''A,'' '' B'' and '' C,'' which are heretofore quoted at 
length in this brief. 
If there was any basis for the admission of such oral 
testimony it must be that the written instruments were 
deemed ambiguous or uncertain. 
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It will be noted that Exhibit'' A,'' the earnest money 
agreement, provides that possesion is to be ''given in 
90 days (seller to occupy north apartment for two years 
rent free). That instrum·ent was drawn by the defen-
dant J. Oscar Garrett and therefore the same should be 
construed, if it is subject to construction, against him. 
It will be observed that the defendant J. Oscar 
Garrett put in the contract a provision that the plaintiff 
was not to have possession, for two years, of the part 
of the premises that were to be occupied by the defen-
dants. If it was necessary for defendants to reserve said 
right it would seem that it was equally necessary for the 
defendants to make provision that the Haddocks should 
remain in possession, if such was in fact the agre·ement. 
Certainly so far as the plaintiff was concerned he was 
not in possession of the store building any more than he 
was given possession of the part of the premises retained 
by the defendants. 
What con~titutes possesion of lands has been before 
the courts on numerous occasions. In National Cypress 
Pole Piling Co. vs. Hemphill Lumber Co., 31 SW (2d) 
1059; 1063; 325 Mo. 807, a number of cases are cited and 
discussed. The following citation from 49 C. J. page 
1094 is approved: 
''Possession of land has been defined as the 
actual control by physical occupation, and the 
holding and exercise of dominion over it; the im-
m·ediate and exclusive dominion over it; that posi-
tion or relation which gives to one its use and 
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control and excludes all others from like use or 
control." 
In the case of Brewer vs. Curtis, 197 A 780, 783, 
130 Pa. Supra 270 and again in Moore v. Boyd, 30 P. 
(2d) 502, 503, 59 App. D. C. 252 it is held that possession 
of land means the exclusive exercise of dominion over 
land in the sense of occupancy. 
In the case of Bank of America Nat. Trust and 
Savings Assn. vs. Bank of Amador County, 28 Pac. (2d) 
86, 89; 135 Cal. App. 714, the court quotes with approval 
the text from 49 C. J. page 1094 heretofore referred to 
in the case of National Cypress Pole Puling Co. vs. 
Hemphill. In the California case last cited a number of 
other cases are cited and discussed. 
The ~ases above cited are, we believe, sufficient to 
advise the court of the trend of judicial authority. But 
this case is not controlled alone by the language of the 
original contract, because that contract was merged in 
the warranty deed which, together with the mortgage 
given for the balance of the purchase price, constituted 
the consumated agreement. 
We have a statute, U. C. A. 1943, 78-1-11, which pre-
scribes the form of a warranty deed. That is the form of 
the deed given by the defendants to the plaintiffs. The 
affect of such a deed is thus provided for by the section 
above referred to. 
'' Such deed when executed as required by 
law shall have the ,effect of a conveyance in fee 
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simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of 
the premises therein named, together with all the 
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto 
belonging that he is lawfully seized of the prem-
ises; that he has good right to convey the same, 
that he guarantees the grantee his heirs and as-
signs the quiet possession thereof; that the prem-
ises are free from all encumbrances and that the 
grantor, heir, heirs and personal representatives 
will forever warrant and defend the title thereto 
in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all 
lawful claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such 
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed 
following the description of the land.'' 
The uniform holding of the courts so far as we are 
able to ascertain is in accord with the statement of the 
law contained in Vol. 7, Sec. 3740, page 214 of Thompson 
on Real Property where it is said: 
''A covenant of general warranty is the 
broadest and most effective ·covenant in a deed 
and warrants that the grantor has not conveyed 
the property described therein or any right, title 
or interest therein to any person other than the 
grantee, and that the property is free from en-
cumbrances.'' 
Such is the holding of our own Supreme Court in Van 
Cott vs. Jacklin, 62 Utah 412; 226 Pac. 460. We quote 
the following from that case. In the Pacific Reporter, 
page 461 it is said : 
''As every lawyer well knows, the law is well 
settled that deeds, like all other written instru-
ments, may not be contradicted, varied or added 
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to by parole. While that is not precisely what was 
attempted in this case in the form just stated, yet 
limiting plaintiff's rights to the boundary lines as 
they appear upon the land is in legal effect the 
same as though the defendant had been permitted 
to vary the terms of the written description of 
the lands conveyed by him and to withdraw the 
small area in disput from the effect of his coven-
ants of warranty and for quiet enjoyment. The 
foregoing covenants are inserted in deeds of con-
veyance as against any defect of title and he has 
a right to rely on the deed as written as against 
verbal statements to the contrary. The law is 
well stated in :Jiaupen, Marketable Title to Real 
Estate at page 335 thus : 
''The covenants of warranty is intended as 
much for the protection of the purchaser against 
known defects of title as against those which are 
latent and unknown. It is therefore no defense to 
an action on the covenant that the purchaser knew 
at the time it was taken that ther~e was an adverse 
claim to the land.'' 
A number of other cases are cited in the Utah case above 
referred to and an examination of such cases support 
what is claimed for them. 
"The inability of the purchas·er to enter into 
possession of the land without committing a tres-
pass by reason of the paramount title being in 
another has the same effect as respects the right 
of action for a breach of covenants contained in 
the deed, as would an eviction if possession had 
been acquired. The purchase of a paramount 
title in the face of its assertion and to avoid suit 
thereon is equivalent to an eviction authorizing an 
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action for breach.'' 7 Thompson on Real Pro-
perty, Sec. 3763, page 234. 
The following cases are cited in a foot note which 
supports the text: Fritz vs. Pusey, 31 Minn. 368, 18 N.vV. 
94, Resser vs, Carney, 52 Minn. 397; 54 N. W. 89; Shat-
tuck vs. Laub, 65 N.Y. 499; 22 Am. Rep. 656; Jayha vs. 
Smith 132 Ga. 779, 65 S. E. 68, Shaw vs. Guthrie, 14 Ga. 
App., 303; 80 S.E. 735; Dornell vs. Thompson, 10 Maine 
170; 25 Am. Dec. 629 ; Brooks vs. Mohl, 104 Minn. 404; 
116 N. W. 931; Drury vs. Shummray, 1 Am. Dec. 704; 
Morgan vs. Haley, 107 V a. 331; 58 S. E. 564. 
So also is there a constructive eviction when the 
purchaser is unable to obtain possession by reason of a 
paramount title and possession in another. The pur-
chaser is not required to commit a tresspass in his 
endeavor to make an actual entry. The covenant is 
broken when at the time of the conveyance the land is 
encumbered by a lease under which the lessee holds pos-
session with an agreement to convey the land to him on 
the payment of a certain sum. 7 Thompson on Real Pro-
perty, Sec. 3764, page 235. Among the cases cited in sup-
port of the text are: Playter vs. Cunningham, 21 Cal. 
229; Planter vs. Vincent 187 Cal. 443; 202 Pac. 655; 
Claflin vs. Case, 53 Kan. 5'60; 36 Pac. 1062; Green vs. 
Baker, 66 Mont. 568; 214 Pac. 88. 
''The possession of one holding adversely to 
the grantee is prima facie evidence of title in 
the adverse holder and of eviction of the grantee. 
In an action to recover damages for a breach of 
covenants of warranty of title and for quiet en-
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joyment, the plaintiff, to establish prima facie 
the breaches alleges, is required merely to prove 
that he has either been evicted or kept out of pos-
session by one in actual possession claiming title 
paramount to his own.'' 7 Thompson Real Pro-
perty, Sec. 3767, page 237 and cases cited in foot 
notes to the text. 
We shall not burden the court with an analysis of the 
cases cited in the foot notes to the text just cited but 
observe that they are all to the effect that when a war-
ranty deed (such as is provided by our law) is given the 
covenants thereof are all inclusive. We think no one 
would seriously contend that such a deed does not war-
rant against the existance of a lease upon the lands con-
veyed, or if such a contention should be made it is wholly 
withou't support in the authorities. The existance of a 
lease is an encumbrance. It prevents the owner of the 
premises from the peaceable enjoyment thereof. In our 
search we have not found a case which holds or lends 
sup,port to the claim that the covenants of a warranty 
deed, such as that here involved, are not breached if and 
when there is a lease on the premises conveyed. 
It may also be noted that even if, contrary to our 
contention, the parol evidence offered by the defendant 
should be properly received it is doubtful if the same 
can be given any legal effect. Such loose s1tatements as 
the plaintiff should take care of the Haddocks could 
mean many things. There is no evidence that plaintiff 
was advised of the terms of the lease at or prior to the 
time he received the conveyance of the property. Obvi-
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ously any conversation had with respect to the Haddock 
lease after the plaintiff received the deed could have no 
binding effect upon the rights of the parties. 
There is some evidence touching the question of 
whether or not the Haddock lease was valid. No useful 
purpose could be served by discussing the lease because 
whatever conclusion may be reached with respect thereto 
the defendants undertook by their agreement in the con-
tract and by the warranty deed to put the plaintiff in 
possession and having failed to do so they should re-
spond in damages. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO AD-
MIT EVIDENCE OF THE SPECIAL DAMAGES 
PLEADED BY THE PLAINTIFF. 
Of course, this court may not fix the damages sus-
\ained by the plaintiff on account if the hreaeh of the 
contract and the covenants contained in the warranty 
deed. However, if a new trial is ordered as plaintiff 
contends it should be the question of special damages 
is certain to come up again at the new trial. 
The trial court evidently took the view that no re-
covery may be had for anticipated profits that may be 
derived from conducting a business. The current deci-
sion of the courts of last resort hold to the contrary. The 
law in such particular is thus stated in 15 Am. J ur., page 
456, Sec. 53 : 
''In addition to general damages, one in-
jured by the breach of a contract to which he is a 
party is entitled to recover special damages which 
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arise from circumstances peculiar to the particu-
lar case, where those circumstances were communi-
cated to, or known by, the other party at the time 
the contract was made; that is, he may recover 
such damages as are the reasonable and natural 
consequences of the breach under the circum-
stances so disclosed and as may reasonably be 
supposed to have been in the contemplation of 
both parties.'' 
Further quoting from 15 A. Jur., page 561, Sec. 151 
it is said: 
''As a general rule, profits which would have 
been realized if a contract had been performed 
may be recovered as damages for its breach, pro-
vided they are susceptible of being ascertained 
with reasonable certainty * * * . '' 
The evidence shows without conflict that the defen-
dants prior to and at the time the contracts and deed 
were executed knew that plaintiff was purchasing the 
premises for the purpose of conducting therein a grocery 
store and meat market and that he owned some beef 
cattle which he intended to sell through the meat market. 
It is plaintiff's contention that the court erred in exclud-
ing evidence calculated to show the profits he would have 
realized from the operation of the store and meat market 
if he had been given possession of the property. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
ON ALL OF THE ISSUES. 
It will be noted that in its finding numbered 6, R-53, 
the trial court merely found in effect that the allegations 
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in the complaint in so far as the same conflicted with the 
other findings made by the court were untrue. This 
court has repeatedly held that such a finding is not a 
compliance with the provisions of U. C. A. 1943, 104-26-3. 
That statute has upon numerous occasions been con-
strued by this court. Among such cases are: Giuque vs. 
Salt Lake City, 42 Ut. 89; 127 Pac. 429. Baker vs. Hatch, 
70 Ut. 1; 257 Pac. 673. Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Ut. 444; 
271 Pac. 31. 
The failure to make findings upon all material issues 
is reversible error. Popes vs. Eakle, 78 Utah 342; 2 Pac. 
(2d) 909. West vs. Standard Fuel Co. 81 Utah 178; 17 
Pac. (2d) 292. 
NEITHER THE FINDINGS OF FACT, THE CON-
CLUSIONS OF LAW NOR THE JUDGEMENT IS 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND 
NEITHER THE CONCLUSIONS OF LA\V NOR THE 
JUDGMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
vV e have heretofore directed the attention of the 
court to the fact that oral statements occuring before, 
during or after the written instruments were executed 
were inadmissible to vary the terms of the written instru-
ments which were executed and which constitute the 
agreement made by the parties. There is no other eYi-
dence which supports or tends to support the findings 
which plaintiff has attacked in his assignments. 
Moreover even if it should be held, contrary to 
plaintiff's contention, that such evidence was competent, 
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still as we have heretofore :pointed out the same were 
merged in the contracts and the warranty deed. In other 
words the rights of the parties must be determined by 
the terms of the ·written contracts and the warranty 
deed. All the negotiations were merged in ·such docu-
ments. That being so the findings of the trial court 
touching such negotiations cannot be said to aid the 
defendants. Thus the findings as to the negotiations 
become immaterial. 
The conclusions of law and judgment must stand 
or fall solely upon the terms of the contracts and the 
warranty deed. There is no language in such instruments 
which support or tend to support the conclusions of law 
or the judgment. It thus follows that the findings of 
fact do not support either the conclusions of law nor the 
judgment. 
The judgment appealed from should be reversed 
with directions to grant a new trial with costs to ap-
pellant. 
Respectfully submitted 
J. Rulon Morgan 
Elias Hansen 
Att,o.rneys for Pla.intiff and 
Appelavnt 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
